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WHEN WORLDVIEWS COLLIDE: LINGUISTIC
THEORY MEETS LEGAL SEMANTICS IN
UNITED STATES V. X-CITEMENT VIDEO, INC.
CRAIG HOFFMAN*
PRELUDE
Linguists and lawyers both study language; however, a mutual confusion
about the purposes of linguistic and legal analyses inhibits what could be
a productive collaboration. To linguists, analysis is science. Linguists use
model sentences to test their hypotheses about a natural phenomenon
(linguistic competence). To lawyers, analysis is argument. Lawyers look at
actual sentences and try to determine what they mean in a legal context.
Although sentences are the common medium of study, linguists and
lawyers view sentences from opposite directions. Lawyers impose
interpretations on sentences; linguists use sentences to test their theories
about language. These divergent worldviews are represented graphically
below.
LAW
(Interpretation) > SENTENCES - > (Theory)
LINGUISTIC COMPETENCE
I would like to take a closer look here at how linguists and lawyers look
at language (sentences) and how they build analyses in their own
disciplines. I will then suggest how the more theoretical approach of
linguists could be integrated with the more practical approach of lawyers.
The goal is to begin to develop a framework for a principled legal
semantics.' I will refer throughout to United States v. X-Citement Video,
Inc.' I will offer both a critique of the linguists' amicus brief in X-
* Instructor of Legal Writing, Georgetown University Law Center. J.D. University of Texas
(1985); Ph.D. (Linguistics) University of Connecticut (1981).
I. 1 do not envision yet another "grand theory" of statutory interpretation, such as those discussed
and eschewed by Bill Eskridge and Philip Frickey in their article, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990). My mission is a much more modest one. I intend to suggest
only that legal semantics is a necessary component to any theory or method of textual interpretation in
the law.
2. 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994).
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Citement Video and an analysis of the statute at issue in the case using the
proposed legal semantics.
PREDICTABILITY IN LINGUISTICS AND THE LAW
The difference between the theoretical worldviews of the linguist and the
lawyer reveals itself most prominently in their relative conceptions about
the role of "predictability" in theoretical analysis. Predictability, in the legal
sense, insures that lawyers, judges, and the public will be able to rely on
a statute or a precedent with as little uncertainty as possible. For example,
if bankruptcy courts within a particular federal circuit vary in their
application of a certain bankruptcy code provision, the appeals court must
supply predictability by deciding among the competing interpretations. This
process provides predictability to bankruptcy law for those who rely upon
it-no science here, just practical problem solving.
To linguists, predictability is something altogether different. Consider the
sentences in (1) and (2) below.
(1) a. John gave a book to Mary.
b. John gave Mary a book.
(2) a. John drove a car to France.
*b. John drove France a car.
Any valuable theory of grammar must be able to account for the
variation in sentences (1)a and (1)b. A theory will be more highly valued
if it provides a non-obvious and principled way to distinguish these
sentences from those in (2)a and (2)b. In this sense, a highly valued theory
will predict that sentences like (2)b will not occur and, concomitantly, that
this non-occurrence leads to, or stems from, some generalization about
linguistic competence.3 Predictability, in this scientific sense, provides a
way for linguists to evaluate competing theories of grammar.4 As a couple
of the participants in the Northwestern/Washington University Law School
Law and Linguistics Conference pointed out, linguistics might get mixed
grades as a science. However, the important thing for lawyers to understand
3. It could be that a general theory of grammar which treated the "to" in "give a book to Mary"
as syntactically distinct from ther "to" in "drove a car to France" would capture some generalization
about a speaker's knowledge of English that a grammar which treated them identically would not:
perhaps the former functions as a dative marker of some kind and the latter functions as a locative
preposition of direction. Using speaker's intuitions, linguists would then test to see what this grammar
predicts will be the most internally consistent and empirically correct treatment of this phenomenon.
4. For a quick and thorough explanation of how linguists think about language, see DAVID
LIGHTFOOT, THE LANGUAGE LOTTERY: TOWARD A BIOLOGY OF GRAMMARS (1982).
[VOL. 73:1215
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is that linguists view their inquiry as scientific.
INTEGRATION IN LINGUISTIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
In building theories of grammar, linguists have always been aware of the
contributions of different aspects, or components, of the general theory. The
general theory will use a syntactic component to account for some
phenomena, e.g., the sentences in (1) and (2) above, and it will use a
semantic component or a pragmatic component to account for others. Each
of these components will have its own internal rules that will be both
internally consistent and compatible with the general theory. In the
examples below, the most scientifically elegant treatment of the syntax
requires recourse to a perceptual component in the grammar to properly
capture the empirical data. Consider the sentences in (3).
(3) a. The professor was fired.
b. The professor the students liked best was fired.
*c. The professor the students the cops busted liked best was fired.
**d. The professor the students the cops the chief recommended for
promotion busted liked best was fired.
The phenomenon demonstrated by the sentences in (3)a and (3)b has been
called "center embedding." As speakers of English, we know that it is
possible in a simple sentence to embed a relative clause and to delete the
complementizer ("whom" or "that") between the subject and the verb
phrase. In fact, we would want any grammar of English to predict that
sentence (3)b is part of the grammar of English, and any grammar that
predicted otherwise would be a less valuable theory.
So, what do we do with sentences (3)c and (3)d? Sentence (3)c is a
double center embedding; it seems bad. Sentence (3)d is a triple center
embedding; it seems even worse. The theoretical question becomes this:
should the syntactic rules of the grammar predict that sentence (3)b is
English, and that sentences (3)c and (3)d are not? Certainly, any grammar
of English must include some explanation of how center embeddings such
as sentence (3)b may occur at all. This explanation will optimally be related
to other relative clause formation rules. But what sort of rule could predict
that double and triple center embeddings such as sentences (3)c and (3)d
may not occur?
The interesting question to the linguists is what kind of grammatical
theory will best account for this difference. It could be that the most highly
valued grammar would freely generate all of the sentences in (3) through
a single, general relative clause formation rule. The theory would explain
19951 1217
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the non-occurrence of sentences (3)c and (3)d as a perceptual phenomenon
rather than a linguistic one. That is to say that the sentences in (3)c and
(3)d are "grammatical," but they are so difficult to understand and produce
that they do not occur.5 From the linguists' worldview, this theory would
have the benefit of not only retaining a simple relative clause formation
rule in the syntax but also accounting for the awkwardness of the double
and triple center embeddings in a principled manner.6
Notice that this whole theoretical question is not particularly interesting
from the lawyer's worldview. To the lawyer, a legal analysis of this
situation is simple: sentences (3)a and (3)b are "legal" and sentences (3)c
and (3)d are not. Again, linguists are primarily focussed on what language
is and what their theories predict about it. Lawyers are primarily focussed
on how language is used and how their analyses can produce a sound
result. In developing legal semantics, the linguists' view of theory as
integrated components could be quite useful.
BUILDING A LEGAL SEMANTICS FOR X-CITEMENT VIDEO
Given their differing approaches, it is not surprising that the linguists'
and the lawyers' theoretical worldviews collided in discussions of the X-
Citement Video case. Although confusion gripped the group during their
discussions of the case, X-Citement Video does provide an excellent
example of the kind of fresh perspective linguists can bring to legal
problems.7
In discussing X-Citement Video, the linguists expressed a somewhat self-
righteous horror that a lawyer might contend that a legal principle might
"trump" an objective syntactic analysis. The context was a lawyer's
suggestion that, in offering a legal interpretation of the statute in the X-
5. The interaction of syntax and perceptual constraints in language comprehension is the subject
of intensive study by psycholinguists. See, e.g., Stephen Crain and Janet Dean Fodor, How can
Grammars Help Parsers? in NATURAL LANGUAGE PARSING 94 (David R. Dowty et al. eds., 1985).
6. My intuitions tell me that the "badness" of sentence (2)b is qualitatively different from the
"badness" of sentences (3)c and (3)d. Whereas (2)b seems wholly impossible, sentences (3)c and (3)d
are just annoyingly complex. I think that it is desirable that the grammar of English capture these
intuitions by predicting that sentence (2)b is syntactically ungrammatical and sentences (3)c and (3)d
are not.
7. Particularly interesting was the discussion of United States v. Cochran, 17 F.3d 56 (3d Cir.
1994). Only a linguist could have explained so well the difference in the scope analysis of"knowingly"
between a complex noun phrase and the parenthetical "if- clause." I cannot resist pointing out, however,
that the phrase labeled a "gerund phrase" in the analysis of the Cochran case is used as an adjective
and is more accurately labeled a "participial phrase." This distinction is only a technical one, and I do
not think that it affects the analysis at all.
[VOL. 73:1215
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Citement Video case, the syntactic analysis of "knowingly" might not be as
relevant to the ultimate interpretation of the statute as the special legal
meaning of "knowingly" when it appears in a criminal statute. The idea
was that the most "natural" syntactic parsing of the statute would be
discarded in light of an overriding legal principle-i.e., "knowingly" should
be read to apply to those elements of the statute that define the criminal
conduct. The linguists dismissed this idea as abhorrent and unscientific.
I think that the concept of "trumping" may not be wholly accurate,
however. It may be more fitting to think of the majority opinion in X-
Citement Video in terms of "integration." The syntax is not trumped by
legal principles; rather, the syntax and the legal principles work together to
form an integrated interpretation of the statute. Such an analysis results in
the most highly valued legal interpretation of the statute because it reflects
the relative weights of its various linguistic and legal components. Linguists
could be immeasurably helpful in creating a legal semantics which could
formalize how the semantic content of a particular term of art, such as
"knowingly," could interact with the syntax of a statute to yield an
integrated interpretation.
For example, in applying this sort of heuristic for interpreting statutes to
the X-Citement Video case, we could begin with the objective syntactic
analysis suggested by the authors of the amicus brief:
(4) Any person who knowingly TRANSPORTs X, if producing X
involves Y, shall be punished.
As lawyers, we have legal intuitions about different parts of the statute.
First, we know that "knowingly" is semantically loaded because it
embodies the criminal intent (or scienter) element of the statute. Further,
we know it is only because "X" moves through interstate commerce that
it is the province of Congress to regulate it. The "TRANSPORTs"
construct, then, embodies what can be loosely termed a jurisdictional
element of the statute. TRANSPORTS really has nothing to do with what
is being regulated but rather how it is being regulated. "TRANSPORTs" is
roughly analogous then to the "in the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States ... " language in sections (3)(A) and
(4)(A) of the statute.
We might want to say that these scienter and jurisdictional elements in
the legal semantics of the X-Citement Video statute represent one type of
legal semantic operator; this concept is similar to the "regulatory variables"
suggested by the participants. The "if producing X involves Y" language
may represent another type of semantic element. A principled legal
1995] 1219
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semantics could represent the operators and elements of the statute as set
forth below:
[WITH CRIMINAL INTENT] [ACT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
CONGRESS] Any person, if ACT involves X...
Assigning an interpretation to the statute would involve abstracting out
the legally significant semantic operators and deciding on the content of the
semantic elements. The legal semantics would, in effect, abstract the legally
significant semantic operators that would then have scope over the criminal
elements of the statute. The legislative history of the statute could be
helpful in determining the content of the semantic elements.
A theory of legal semantics could begin by defining the set of essential
legally significant semantic operators. Semantic theory would be helpful in
this process. Analyzing the text in this way, we can characterize the process
by which the Supreme Court majority decided on its interpretation of the
statute in X-Citement Video: the semantic scope of the operator, "knowing-
ly," extends into the "if' clause, even though its strict syntactic scope does
not, because the legal semantics abstracts such operators in constructing
interpretations as shown in (4) above. While clearly explicating the
syntactic structure of the statute is an essential first step, the further step of
rigorously investigating the legal semantics of the statute is more appropri-
ate to legal interpretation. This relates to the participants' distinction
between meaning and interpretation, the latter perhaps being the more
appropriate inquiry for lawyers. Meaning, in this use, reflects the syntactic
structure whereas interpretation integrates contextual information with the
syntax. This sort of analysis that integrates contextual information into
semantic analysis should be quite familiar to the linguists. The following
example illustrates how extra-syntactic information can shape meaning in
a non-legal context:
(5) The horse raced past the barn fell.
At first blush, sentence (5) seems ungrammatical. We understand the
sentence to mean that a horse ran quickly past a barn; however, we are
confused when we reach the final word "fell," and we cannot successfully
assign a meaning to this sentence. Imagine, however, that we are watching
two horses compete in a harness race. Imagine further that two horses are
being raced on parallel tracks, and one of the tracks passes a barn at some
point along the way. All of the sudden, one of the horses falls down on the
track, and someone exclaims "The horse raced past the barn fell." With this
context, we are more likely to be able to assign a meaning to the sentence
[VOL. 73:1215
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in (5) where we could not before.
To account for this phenomenon, psycholinguists hypothesize that
speakers employ "online parsing strategies" which aid in assigning meaning
to incoming sentences.8 That is, speakers assign syntactic structures to
speech as they hear it. Because of the time pressures involved in parsing
incoming speech, psycholinguists predict that speakers will first assign the
simplest structure possible. The simplest structure of sentence (5), however,
leads to a "garden path."9 Although sentence (5) is perfectly grammatical,
as we can see given the added context, this grammatical reading is not the
first parse preference. Given the proper context, the interpretation of
sentence (5) becomes much easier.
Similarly, perhaps the simplest syntactic structure we could assign to the
statute in the X-Citement Video case is the one suggested by the linguists
in their amicus brief. The majority opinion decided, however, that this first
parse of the statute would lead to a "garden path" legal interpretation. An
integrated theory of legal semantics would provide a heuristic to appeal
both to the syntax and to relevant legal principles in assigning an
interpretation to a statute.
EPILOGUE
It should be emphasized that linguistic science and legal analysis do have
a commonality of approach. When a linguist postulates a grammatical rule
for a language, he intends to account for a particular linguistic phenomenon
within the context of a complete theory of grammar. When a lawyer
proposes a legal analysis for a set of facts, he intends to account for those
facts within the context of a general body of law. Just as linguists are
constantly vigilant about predicting all and only the grammatical sentences
of the language under study, lawyers are constantly vigilant about limiting
the scope of their legal analyses to avoid "opening the floodgates" or going
down "the slippery slope." These shared instincts provide a solid basis for
joint scholarship. With a deeper understanding of each other's theoretical
worldview, future dialogues among scholars of law and linguistics could
focus on developing a methodology and vocabulary for a legal semantics
and the type of contextual interpretation process which I have briefly
sketched out here. It is through this sort of informed interdisciplinary effort
8. Psycholinguists study the influences of perception and cognition to an integrated model of
linguistic theory and language use.
9. For an extensive discussion of these sentences and their interpretation see Lyn Frazier and
Janet Dean Fodor, The Sausage Machine: a New Two-Stage Parsing Model, 6 Cognition 291 (1978).
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that we can effectively explore the question of meaning (and interpretation)
in a legal text.
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